The first two flights carrying Venezuelan deportees back to Caracas left Texas on February 10. The second Trump presidency is consistent in maintaining a contradictory Venezuela strategy. Heated denunciation of President Nicolas Maduro and recognition of opposition figure Edmundo Gonzalez as legitimate president has been offset by early bilateral diplomatic initiatives on the release of detained US citizens, migrant returns and the six-month renewal of Chevron’s licence in Venezuela.
Analysis
This is an unexpectedly bleak time for Venezuela’s opposition. A second Trump presidency offered the prospect of decisive US action to dislodge Maduro and leverage Gonzalez into power:
- Trump has aligned with the outgoing Biden administration in recognising Gonzalez as the winner of Venezuela’s July 2024 presidential election .
- Gonzalez attended Trump’s January inauguration ceremony as the special guest of Republican Senator Rick Scott of Florida.
- The appointment of vociferous Maduro critic Marco Rubio as secretary of state positioned a long-term ally of the Venezuelan opposition at the heart of US foreign policy .
It was hoped Trump had learned lessons from his first presidency, when White House recognition of opposition figure Juan Guaido as ‘interim president’ in 2019 failed to remove Maduro. The rhetoric of Trump and Rubio in 2024 generated expectations of a more aggressive, if ill-defined, regime change strategy in support of the Gonzalez claim on the presidency.
US strategy shift
Trump’s presidential victory has not — as yet — delivered for Gonzalez.
Another Venezuela narrative was at play during Trump’s 2024 re-election campaign. It centred on Venezuelan migrants, portraying them as criminals, rapists and gang members.
In an April 2024 interview, Trump claimed the crime rate in Venezuela had fallen 67%. He linked this to a deliberate Venezuelan government strategy of deporting criminals, including members of Tren de Aragua, a loose criminal franchise:
- Trump’s language in 2024 was different from 2020, when re-election efforts focused on diaspora votes in key states such as Florida. Capturing this vote influenced Trump’s decision to recognise Guaido. So-called ‘MAGAzuelans’ backed Trump in 2020 because of promises of decisive action to remove Maduro.
- In 2024, Trump paid far less attention to Maduro and the ‘socialist’ threat. ‘Venezuela’ was recast as a US domestic migration and crime problem, requiring decisive action to remove Venezuelan migrants.
This interpretation of the Venezuela problem has prevailed.
In line with Trump’s earlier assertions that the notoriously high crime rate in Venezuela has declined, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified “notable improvement” in the Venezuelan economy, public health and crime situation. According to the DHS, this makes it “safe” to terminate the TPS of an estimated 600,000 Venezuelans and begin repatriation.
Within three days of taking office, US Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem set out that Venezuelans will “not be able to stay here and violate our laws for another 18 months.”The measure specifically refers to an estimated 348,000 people made eligible for TPS until October 2026 by the Biden administration days before it left office, which applied to those present in the United States by July 2023.
Opposition under pressure
Xenophobic language from senior US officials has met with a muted response from the high-profile team around Gonzalez. This, and the reversal of TPS, has caused recrimination in the MAGAzuelan community and outraged a large segment of Venezuelan public opinion.
Gonzalez and opposition leader Maria Corina Machado claim close White House connections but have not been able to moderate US rhetoric or action.
The opposition parallel presidencies of Guaido and Gonzalez are also under further scrutiny in relation to USD3.5bn disbursed by USAID between 2017 and 2024 as ‘humanitarian aid’ and an additional USD336mn in democracy assistance.
Rapprochement?
If Trump wants progress on deportations, there must be a working relationship with the Venezuelan government.
At the beginning of February, Maduro received Trump’s Special Presidential Envoy Richard Grenell. The meeting was productive, leading to the release of six US citizens from Venezuelan custody and a reported agreement from Maduro to receive and pay for repatriation flights from the United States, which US ‘border czar’ Tom Homan said would begin within 30 days. The Maduro administration is reported to have set aside USD10mn to support resettlement projects within Venezuela.
The meeting with Grenell has boosted Maduro’s authority, following his persistent failure to present auditable evidence of his July 2024 presidential election victory .
Venezuela has emphasised full legal cooperation with US efforts to dismantle the Tren de Aragua crime group. An executive order signed by Trump on the day he took office scaled up the group’s designation from “transnational crime organization” to “foreign terrorist organization.” The Maduro government has long maintained that the Tren de Aragua has a paramilitary base and that its growth and impunity was facilitated by former Colombian Presidents Ivan Duque and Alvaro Uribe.
As with the USAID revelations, organised crime links may prove more damaging for the opposition (although there are also allegations that the group colluded with the government in the case of the killing of a Venezuelan dissident in Chile last year).
Policy contradictions
The transactional turn in Washington might logically progress to a lifting of US sanctions if Maduro continues to walk in step with Trump. There will be ongoing theatre to ease the shock that might accompany substantive dialogue and any resetting of US-Venezuela ties. In contrast to Grenell’s positive assessment that “diplomacy is back” and “talking is a tactic,” Rubio maintains Trump will “take actions … to inflict serious damage and harm on the Maduro regime.” This contradictory US diplomacy is not sustainable, although Rubio may become the main target of criticism by the Cuban-American and Venezuelan-American communities.
For now, Maduro can exploit the divisions, serious or otherwise, within the Trump administration and channel the nationalist rancour generated by the US anti-migrant narrative.
Looming elections
The National Electoral Council has announced that elections for 277 national Legislative Assembly members and 23 regional governors will take place on April 27. Gonzalez and Machado are now in a struggle to convince Venezuelans to boycott the elections until the ‘legitimate’ July 28 presidential result is upheld. With the authority of Machado and Gonzalez gravely weakened by Trump’s nativist lurch, opposition factions are quickly realigning.
Maduro is in the ascendent, buoyed by apparent diplomatic success. However, the repatriation and reintegration of tens of thousands of disaffected and unemployed Venezuelans will be a major political and economic challenge for the government. At the same time, Trump will prove a very unpredictable partner.